




Boğaziçi University
Sociology Data Lab

2026

2024 Turkish Social Values Study

Conspiracy Report



2024 Turkish Social Values Study Conspiracy Report

June 2026

Principal Investigator
Ceylan Engin
Assist. Prof.
Boğaziçi University

Authors

Ceylan Engin
Sinan Erensü
Gece Kaya
Cansu Mine Yıldırım
Vuslat Haz Alibaşoğlu
Zeynep Köse
İlkay Ertürk
Emre Turan
Daniela Kızıldağ
Sena Akkoç

Proofread

Nehir Çakar
Emre Turan
Janset Nehir Gizer

E-mail: socdatalab@bogazici.edu.tr

Website: sdl.bogazici.edu.tr

Project Support: This project is funded by TUBITAK 1001, project number 223K652.

Boğaziçi University Sociology Data Lab© 2026

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	iv
1. Introduction	1
1.1 Methodology	2
1.2 Sociodemographic Characteristics	4
2. Conceptual Framework	8
3. Environmental Conspiracy Theories	10
4. Health Conspiracy Theories	16
5. Artificial Intelligence Conspiracy Theories	23
6. Conclusion	31
7. Endnote	33
8. References	34

Index

Figure a.1 Gender Distribution, N=1587.....	4
Figure a.2 Age Distribution, N=1587.....	4
Figure a.3 Educational Attainment, N=1587.....	5
Figure a.4 Employment Status, N=1586.....	5
Figure a.5 Political Party Affiliation, N=1587.....	6
Figure a.6 Ideological Distribution, N=1479.....	6
Figure a.7 Distribution of Interpersonal Trust , N=1585.....	7
Figure a.8 Distribution of Trust in Government, N=1579.....	7
Figure 1.1. Distribution of belief in environmental conspiracy theories.....	11
Figure 1.2. Distribution of means for belief in environmental conspiracy theories by political party preference, N=1564.....	12
Figure 1.3. Distribution of means for belief in environmental conspiracy theories by educational attainment, N=1564.....	12
Figure 1.4. Distribution of agreement rates by type of climate skepticism.....	13
Figure 1.5. Average of climate skepticism by gender, N=1564.....	14
Figure 1.6. Averages of climate skepticism by political party affiliation, N=1564.....	14
Figure 2. Averages of agreement rates with the statement "Vaccines weaken our immune system and expose us to many diseases." by gender, N=1582.....	18
Figure 2.1. Averages of agreement rates with the statement "Pharmaceutical companies block effective methods that can treat serious illnesses in order not to lose profit." by level of trust in others, N=1576.....	18
Figure 2.2. Distribution of responses to the statement "Coronavirus is the result of deliberate and concealed efforts of some governments or organizations." by employment status, N=1555.....	19
Figure 2.3. Averages of the agreement rates with the statement "The coronavirus is the result of deliberate and concealed efforts of some governments or organizations" by political views, N=1457.....	20
Figure 2.4. Distribution of responses to the statement "Societies are tried to be controlled through the Coronavirus vaccine." by level of trust in the government, N=1558.....	21
Figure 3.1 The distribution of levels of concern about artificial intelligence by genders, N=1545.....	26
Figure 3.2 Distribution of agreement with the statement "The world is becoming a much better place thanks to technology." by gender, N=1577.....	27
Figure 3.3 Distribution of agreement with the statement "The world is becoming a much better place thanks to technology." by employment status, N=1576.....	28
Figure 3.4 Distribution of agreement with the statement "Human life will be controlled by artificial intelligence in the future." by employment status, N=1551.....	29
Figure 3.5 Distribution of agreement with the statement "Artificial intelligence will surpass human intelligence in the future." by employment status, N=1553.....	30

Executive Summary

This report examines the projections of conspiracy theories regarding environment, health, and artificial intelligence in Turkey based on data from the 2024 Turkey Social Values Study (TSVS), supported by TÜBİTAK 1001. The survey was conducted using the Computer-Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) method with 1587 participants across Turkey and utilized a representative sample based on a multi-stage cluster sampling design.

Environmental Conspiracy Theories: 73% of the individuals in Turkey have stated their concern about climate change. The majority of respondents believe that climate change is real, caused by humans, and that its consequences are not exaggerated. However, 24% believe climate change is planned by developed countries to constrain the development of other countries. These findings reveal that perceptions of climate change in Turkey have taken on a new dimension, leaning toward conspiracy theory-based approaches that go beyond traditional skepticism regarding climate change.

Health Conspiracy Theories: When examining health conspiracy beliefs, the idea that pharmaceutical companies hamper effective treatments proves to be a common theme. Also, it is noteworthy that belief in the coronavirus as a deliberate, covert effort is significantly higher among the unemployed, and that as trust in the government decreases, belief that society is controlled by vaccines increases. These findings reveal that the inclination to health conspiracy beliefs in Turkey derives from broad socioeconomic dynamics such as unemployment and institutional/interpersonal distrust rather than simply a lack of information.

Artificial Intelligence Conspiracy Theories: When examining beliefs about artificial intelligence, 44% of participants believe the technology has made the world a better place, while 59% are concerned about it. Also, the majority of participants believe that artificial intelligence will surpass the human mind and gain control over human life in the future. Findings show women, compared to men, and unemployed individuals carry higher levels of concern.

Assessment and Policy Recommendations: Research findings show that rising global risks, institutional distrust, and sovereignty concerns shape beliefs in conspiracy theories. It also shows that belief in conspiracy theories in Turkey cannot be explained solely by misinformation or a lack of scientific literacy; rather, it is linked to broader societal concerns such as political trust, trust in science, national sovereignty, economic independence, and trust in institutions. In this regard, establishing a trust-based, consistent communication mechanism among public institutions, scientists, and media actors should be prioritized in policymaking. Conducting transparent decision-making processes in health, environmental, and technology policies may ensure that the public is not only informed but also feels included in the process. For this reason, rather than short-term strategies that focus solely on correcting misinformation in efforts against conspiracy theories, adopting communication policies in the fields of health, the environment, science, and technology that are more transparent, consistent, and aimed at building trust may be preferable.

The Turkish Social Values Study (TSVS), supported by TUBİTAK 1001, aims to understand changes in social values in Turkey and to contribute to long-term policy development by measuring trends in critical areas such as health, science, the environment, gender, migration, and the economy.

Present global events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, environmental crisis, and technological advancements, are deepening the atmosphere of uncertainty and affecting individuals' confidence in scientific authorities, political institutions, and expert systems. This environment of increasing distrust not only transforms individual risk perceptions but also collective value judgments, ways of approaching information, and tendencies towards conspiracy theories.

For this reason, TSVS examines changes in social values through three key issues that have emerged as risk factors in the aftermath of the pandemic:


- Fertility intentions in the context of family and gender
- Tendencies to believe in conspiracy theories
- Individuals' attitudes toward immigrants

This report is prepared based on data from TSVS under the heading of "Health, Environment, Science and Technology". The main purpose of this report is to analyze social values, attitudes, risk perceptions, and conspiracy theory beliefs regarding these fields and to inform the public and policymakers. The aim is to generate knowledge, particularly about factors that shape thought systems, such as levels of social trust, beliefs about institutions, and conspiracy theories about information.

The Turkish Social Values Study (TSVS 2024) measures changing values across Turkey through a nationally representative survey. Consistent with other international studies in the field, data were collected using the Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) method.

The TSVS sample was designed to be representative of all Turkish-speaking citizens aged 18 and older residing in Turkey. Respondents were selected using random probability sampling methods at every stage. Data were collected according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics Level 2 (NUTS-2) classification. Accordingly, a multistage cluster sampling design was employed based on Turkey's 26 NUTS-2 subregions, which group the country's 81 provinces according to their socioeconomic similarities.

The sample selection process consisted of three stages in line with the multistage cluster sampling design. In the first stage, 262 geographic clusters (Primary Sampling Units, PSUs), each consisting of 100 households, were identified across Turkey's 26 NUTS-2 geographic subregions. In the second stage, a total of 19 addresses were selected from each PSU through simple random sampling, including 14 primary and 5 reserve addresses. In the third stage, one respondent was selected from each address using the last birthday method. During data collection, it was not necessary to activate the reserve sample.




The Turkish Social Values Study (TSVS) survey, which included 1,587 respondents, examined values and attitudes related to fertility intentions, conspiracy theories, and migration through a range of quantitative measures. Data collected during the fieldwork were cleaned and analyzed using the statistical software program STATA.

This report presents the sociodemographic characteristics of the participants, their attitudes towards health, environment, and technology, and their levels of belief in various conspiracy theories in these areas, based on the questions in the "Health, Environment, Science and Technology" section of the TSVS study.

1.2


Sociodemographic Characteristics

Figure a.1 Gender Distribution (N=1587)




The TSVS survey sample consists of 61.6% women and 38.4% men.

Figure a.2 Age Distribution (N=1587)



The ages of the survey participants range from 18 to 86. When the participants were classified according to age groups, it is observed that 12.6% belonged to the 18-25, 41.4% to the 26-40, 28% to the 41-50 and 18% to the 51-86 age group.

Figure a.3 Educational Attainment (N=1587)



The educational background of the survey participants ranged from "never attended school" to "master's degree and above." When participants were categorized according to their highest completed education, it was observed that 35% fell into the primary school and below group and 16.7% completed middle school. Additionally, 35.1% of participants have completed high school, while the remaining 13.2% have completed university or a higher level of education.

Figure a.4 Employment Status (N=1586)

When participants are classified by employment status, 53.5% are employed full-time or part-time, 14.3% are not employed, and 32.2% are housewives.





Figure a.5 Distribution of political party affiliation (N=1587)



37% of respondents stated they would vote for the CHP and 36.2% for the AKP if an election were held next Sunday. These rates are followed by %14 who claim they are undecided or non-voters. 7.4% of participants said they would vote for the DEM Party, while the remaining 5.5% indicated they would vote for other parties.

Figure a.6 Ideological Distribution (N=1479)

When participants are classified according to their ideological positions, it appears that 27.9% are on the right and 22% are in the center-right. 19.5% of participants are on the left, and 23.5% are in the center-left. Only 7% of participants position themselves in the center.






Figure a.7 Distribution of Interpersonal Trust (N=1585)



When participants' trust in other people was examined, it was found that 49.7% had moderate trust, 36.2% had little or no trust, and only 14.1% had high or complete trust.

Figure a.8 Distribution of Trust in Government (N=1579)



When looking at participants' trust in the government, it is seen that 37.4% have moderate trust, 37.4% have high or complete trust, and only 25.3% have little or no trust.

With the concept of "risk society," Ulrich Beck (1992) emphasizes that modern societies are increasingly facing invisible risks that transcend regional boundaries and require expert knowledge. To contest uncertainty and distrust under the new risk regime, individuals become dependent on scientific authorities and institutional structures. However, the modern risks Beck comments on are produced by the modern institutions and technology that are expected to manage them.

In this context, the need for scientific knowledge and the expertise of institutional structures increase simultaneously with the mistrow of these foundations, underlining the self-annihilating nature of modernity. Interrogations regarding institutions that produce and execute knowledge lead to the political and everyday integration of alternative epistemological narratives, such as conspiracy theories, while dependence and distrust simultaneously become widespread regarding institutions and experts.

The economic fluctuations post-COVID-19, earthquakes of February 2023, and extreme weather conditions have deepened social sentiments of uncertainty and distrust in Turkey. Meanwhile, the rapid integration of artificial intelligence tools into our lives raises new concerns about both employment and information security. This section examines the relationship between society and the institutional structures that are needed and questioned concurrently, within these risks and contradictions, in the context of health, environment, and artificial intelligence.

A conspiracy is defined as two or more people coming together to engage in malicious, illegal, or other activities that run counter to the interests of certain groups (Cambridge Dictionary 2024). A conspiracy theory, on the other hand, refers to an explanation of events or social reality through the deliberate efforts of certain actors, that is, through their conspiracies (Dentith 2014).

Historical analyses show that under conditions of widespread uncertainty, such as epidemics, natural disasters, and social unrest, prevalence and belief in conspiracy theories increase (Pipes 1997). Although some studies and historical analyses claim ignorance as the source of conspiracy theories, these theories remain popular today despite scientific advances and increasing accessibility of scientific knowledge (Grzesiak-Feldman 2013; Harambam 2017; Oliver and Wood 2014; Uscinski and Parent 2014).

Recent studies associate the prevalence of conspiracy theories with increasing skepticism and distrust towards authorities and scientific knowledge (Aupers 2012; Heins 2007). Nowadays, conspiracy theories are not merely marginal discourses but a part of popular culture and contemporary politics due to the embrace of such narratives by political leaders and widespread circulation in traditional/social media (Harambam 2017; Mancosu et al. 2022).

This section of the report examines belief in conspiracy theories across three areas: health, environment and climate, and artificial intelligence. The distribution of conspiracy theory beliefs in each area will be analyzed according to different demographic or social identity determinants.

3

Environmental Conspiracy Theories

Environmental threats such as the climate crisis, natural disasters, and ecological destruction shape collective risk perception on a local and global scale, and form the basis for various conspiracy theories. These narratives often suggest that environmental issues such as climate change, ecological destruction, or natural disasters are the result of deliberate manipulation by powerful actors, including governments, international organizations, corporations, and NGOs. These conspiracy theories, which question scientific consensus and institutional authority, sometimes frame environmental crises as an exaggerated or fabricated threat, and sometimes position environmental movements against national interests (Dunlap and McCright 2011; Biddlestone et al. 2022; Erokhine and Komendantova 2024).

In Turkey, particularly since the Gezi Park protests, claims that environmental opposition movements are supported by "external powers" have become widespread; environmentalists and civil society organizations have frequently been associated with foreign funds and international actors (Medeiros 2018; Genç 2021). These convictions reduce support for environmental policies (Biddlestone et al. 2022), decrease individuals' likelihood of making eco-friendly decisions (van der Linden 2015), and weaken the tendency to reduce carbon footprint (Jolley and Douglas 2014). These results show environmental conspiracy beliefs to be an important factor that shapes environmental action, not only on an individual level but also on public and political levels.

While there are studies examining conspiracy theories in Turkish society about health (Özdemir 2021; Eslen-Ziya and Pehlivanlı 2022) and politics (Medeiros 2018; Gürpınar 2019; Balta, Kaltwasser and Yağcı, 2021; Yılmaz and Shipoli 2021), empirical analyses about the environmental domain are quite limited. Although conspiratorial narratives about the environment are widespread, there is a need for studies that systematically assess the extent to which society believes them. In this context, revealing the distribution of beliefs about environmental conspiracy theories across Turkey is critical for both understanding societal attitudes towards environmental policies and for identifying potential obstacles to democratic participation.

This section of the report looks at four conspiracy theories: developed countries hinder development through climate policies, access to underground resources is restricted by Western nations, earthquakes are generated artificially, and foreign powers manipulate environmentalists. Belief in these theories provides important insights into the public's perception of environmental risks, political attitudes, and trust relationships.

Figure 1.1. Distribution of belief in environmental conspiracy theories




Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of agreement with environmental conspiracy theories. Participants were asked to rate these statements on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The environmental conspiracy theory with the highest level of agreement concerns how Western countries prevent Turkey from using its underground resources. Approximately 54% of participants stated they agreed with this statement. The environmental conspiracy theory with the lowest level of agreement, on the other hand, concerns the idea that earthquakes are artificially manufactured (%22.57).

Figure 1.2. Distribution of means for belief in environmental conspiracy theories by political party affiliation (N=1564)




Figure 1.2 shows the mean distribution of belief in environmental conspiracy theories by political party affiliation. While the highest average belongs to AKP voters (Mean=2.79, SD=0.85), the lowest average belongs to DEM party voters (Mean=2.47, SD=1.00).

Figure 1.3. Distribution of means for belief in environmental conspiracy theories by educational attainment (N=1564)




Figure 1.3 shows the mean distribution of belief in environmental conspiracy theories by education level. While the group with the highest average level of belief consists of middle school graduates (Mean=2.77, SD=0.84), the group with the lowest average level of belief consists of those with a university education or higher (Mean=2.58, SD=0.86).

Participants' beliefs and attitudes regarding climate change were examined below three skeptical positions in terms of direct denial, rejection of human influence, and that view the climate crisis is exaggerated. Participants were asked to rate these statements on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).

Figure 1.4. Distribution of agreement rates by type of climate skepticism




Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of participation rates by type of climate skepticism. The vast majority of participants stated that they strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement "There is no such thing as climate change" (77.82%), while only %2.56 of the participants strongly agreed. Belief in the statement denying humans' role in climate change is higher. While 63.80% of participants agree that humans play a role in climate change, 23.43% disagree with this statement. Finally, 17.17% of participants stated that they strongly agree or agree with the statement that the extent of climate change is exaggerated, while 66.82% disagree with this statement.

The average for direct climate change skepticism is 2.27 (SD=0.91), while it rises to 2.30 (SD=1.11) for the belief that climate change is exaggerated, and to 2.40 (SD=1.24) for the statement of denial of human responsibility.

Figure 1.5. Average of climate skepticism by gender (N=1564)




Figure 1.5 shows the average climate skepticism by gender. Women (Mean=2.30, SD=0.93) agree with statements about climate skepticism at a higher level than men (Mean= 2.23, SD = 0.87).

Figure 1.6. Averages of climate skepticism by political party affiliation (N=1564)




Figure 1.6 shows the averages of climate skepticism by political party affiliation. With the exception of the DEM Party (Mean=2.01, SD= 0.93), levels of climate skepticism among voters of the other parties are similar. The groups with the highest levels of climate skepticism consist of the "other" category, which has fewer voters (Mean= 2.36, SD=0.83), and undecided or non-voters (Mean=2.36, SD=0.91).

Section Review

The reported findings indicate that climate change stands out as a source of concern that varies across age groups but remains high overall. Although the level of belief in environmental conspiracy theories is generally low to moderate, the conspiracy theory claiming Western countries are preventing Turkey from using its underground resources has gained relatively high acceptance.

This high acceptance may indicate that environmental conspiracy theories are often intertwined with concerns about economic independence, national sovereignty, and historical insecurities, rather than scientific skepticism. In terms of climate skepticism, direct denial is less common, but "indirect" skeptical attitudes, such as the scale of the climate crisis being exaggerated or the role of human activity being limited, are more prevalent in Turkey. This suggests that scientific consensus is not entirely rejected by society as a whole, but rather reinterpreted through political and ideological filters.

When these findings are thought of as a whole, they reveal that the dynamics of the risk society in Turkey are shaped not only by a lack of information but also by institutional trust, political affiliation, and economic concerns. Strategies to combat conspiracy theories about environmental issues may be insufficient if they focus solely on providing accurate information. These strategies must also take into account the structural and historical factors that fuel feelings of distrust. In particular, how environmental policies are framed by narratives of foreign intervention or damage to national interests may be a reason for support for conspiracy theories. For policymakers, these findings highlight the importance of transparency and sensitivity to local and cultural beliefs while communicating climate and environmental policies.

Furthermore, the fact that climate skepticism is more prevalent among groups with weak political affiliation or those distanced from democratic processes suggests that environmental policies should be designed to appeal not only to specific voter groups but also to broader and more heterogeneous segments of society. These findings indicate that inclusive and multi-layered approaches, which take conspiracy narratives and skeptical attitudes seriously, are needed to increase the social legitimacy of environmental, climate, and science policies.

4

Health Conspiracy Theories

Believing in conspiracy theories regarding health can threaten both individual and public health. Studies show that such beliefs increase skepticism toward vaccines (Freeman et al. 2020; Jolley and Douglas 2014), health authorities (Leonard and Philippe 2021), and public health measures; and that they are associated with refusal of medical treatment (Kalichman 2009) and reduced use of healthcare (Douglas et al. 2015).

Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, belief in conspiracy theories was associated with lower compliance with precautions such as social distancing, testing, and vaccination (Akarsu et al. 2020; Freeman et al. 2020). These negative effects are not limited to behaviors related to health but also extend to social and political spheres. For example, false beliefs that COVID-19 is spread by 5G technology have led to protests and vandalism against 5G towers (Satariano and Alba 2020).

The concept of “trust” emerges as one of the strongest determinants in the literature while examining the origins of these beliefs. Individuals' belief in scientific data is related to their trust in the source of the information. Research shows that a decrease in institutional trust in government and health authorities leads to an increased level of belief in conspiracy theories (Brotherton et al. 2013; Goertzel 1994). However, the issue of trust is not limited to institutions; a lack of interpersonal trust also drives individuals to question official narratives. Individuals who find it difficult to trust others have a higher tendency to look for hidden groups with malicious intent behind events (Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999).

In addition to the trust factor, the heightened sense of uncertainty during times of crisis also turns conspiracy theories into a coping mechanism (Douglas et al. 2017). The sense of powerlessness observed particularly among individuals experiencing economic instability, unemployment, or a sense of exclusion leads these groups to seek a guilty subject to explain their victimization (Uscinski and Parent 2014; van Prooijen 2018). This explains why socioeconomically disadvantaged groups are more likely to give credence to conspiracy theories.

The impact of gender is shaped particularly through perceptions of health and safety from the perspective of demographic variables. The literature indicates that women have a higher risk perception and sensitivity to medical interventions and potential side effects compared to men (Murphy et al. 2021). Specifically, the preference for natural immunity and the motivation to protect bodily integrity stand out as key factors fueling the tendency among women to believe in misinformation about the long-term harmful effects of vaccines (Callaghan et al. 2019; Galasso et al. 2020). Therefore, conspiracy beliefs within this group are associated with health-focused safety concerns rather than a political stance.

This section examines common health conspiracy theories. The data indicate that these beliefs stem from factors such as job loss and social alienation resulting from low levels of trust rather than lack of information. Therefore, this analysis is critical for understanding the trust relationships formed during times of crisis and how societal problems fuel conspiracy theories.

Figure 2. Averages of agreement rates with the statement “Vaccines weaken our immune system and expose us to many diseases.” by gender (N=1582)




Figure 2 shows the average levels of agreement with the statement “Vaccines weaken our immune system and expose us to many diseases.” by gender (on a scale of 1 to 5). Data reveals that the average level of agreement among men was 2.98, and 2.78 among women. In conclusion, it can be said that there is no significant difference between the sexes regarding the belief that vaccines harm the immune system; both men and women similarly hold a neutral/moderate stance on this statement.

Figure 2.1. Averages of agreement rates with the statement “Pharmaceutical companies block effective methods that can treat serious illnesses in order not to lose profit.” by level of trust in others (N=1576)




Figure 2.1 shows the average levels of agreement with the statement, “Pharmaceutical companies block effective methods that can treat serious illnesses in order not to lose profit.” by interpersonal trust levels. Upon examining the data, it can be seen that the overall average of 3.19 is very slightly above the midpoint (3—Neither Agree Nor Disagree).

The differences between the groups are not significant. While the average level of agreement with the statement is highest at 3.40 in the group with “No/Low” interpersonal trust, this average drops to exactly 3.00 (the neutral point) in the group with “High” trust. This suggests that individuals who generally trust others less are slightly more inclined to believe in conspiracy theories about the intentions of pharmaceutical companies.

Figure 2.2. Distribution of responses to the statement “Coronavirus is the result of deliberate and concealed efforts of some governments or organizations.” by employment status (N=1555)




Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of responses to the statement “The coronavirus is the result of deliberate and concealed efforts of some governments or organizations” by employment status. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with this statement on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Unemployed participants tend to agree with the statement more than participants in other groups. Agreement was most common among the unemployed group at 24.89%; this rate was 22.09% among employed individuals and 22.86% among housewives. Similarly, the response rate for ‘Strongly agree’ among the non-working group (16.03%) is significantly higher than that of the other groups, which indicates that belief in conspiracy theories is more widely accepted within this group.

Figure 2.3 Averages of the agreement rates with the statement “The coronavirus is the result of deliberate and concealed efforts of some governments or organizations” by political views (N=1457)




Figure 2.3 shows the average level of agreement among participants with the statement that “Coronavirus is the result of covert government efforts” according to their political views. A left-right scale was used to measure political views, with 0 representing “Left” and 10 representing “Right.”

According to the findings, participants with center (Mean = 3.03, SD = 1.00) and left (Mean = 3.01, SD = 1.30) political views show relatively higher levels of agreement with this statement. In contrast, the agreement rate among right-wing participants is lower (Mean = 2.64, SD = 1.31). The means for the center-left (Mean = 2.79, SD = 1.18) and center-right (Mean = 2.84, SD = 1.07) groups, however, are similar to each other. When these findings are evaluated together, it appears that skepticism is higher among centrist and left-leaning participants.

Figure 2.4. Distribution of responses to the statement “Societies are tried to be controlled through the Coronavirus vaccine.” by level of trust in the government (N=1558)




Figure 2.4 shows the responses to the statement “Societies are tried to be controlled through the Coronavirus vaccine. ” by individuals' levels of trust in the government. Participants were asked to rate this statement on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Upon examining the responses in the figure, it is observed that the “No/Low Trust” group (32.57%) accounts for the highest proportion of responses to the “Agree” category compared to the “Moderate” (29.26%) and “High/Full Trust” (24.14%) groups. A similar pattern can be observed for the “Strongly agree” response, where the “no/low trust” group, at 11.70%, exceeds the other trust levels as well.

In contrast, the opposite pattern is observed while considering the 'Disagree' response. In this response, the high/complete trust group represents the highest rate at 32.88%, while the no/low trust group is at 18.32%. This distribution shows that as the level of trust in the government decreases, responses that affirm the conspiracy theory statement (Agree/Strongly agree) become more frequent.

Section Review

The findings in this section show that belief in conspiracy theories regarding health is shaped by gender, employment status, and levels of trust in institutions.

When the gender variable is examined, it is seen that women are less likely to believe the conspiracy theory "vaccines weaken the immune system" and have higher rates of rejection of this statement compared to men. Although the literature indicates that women have a higher perceived risk regarding medical side effects (Murphy et al. 2021), the findings of this research reveal that women place less reliance on specific anti-vaccine conspiracy narratives than men do.

When employment status and trust relation are observed, socio-economic position stands as a key factor that fuels conspiracy theory beliefs. The findings indicate that unemployed individuals and homemakers are more likely to believe that the coronavirus emerged as a result of a "covert and deliberate effort" than employed individuals. This result displays consistency with the literature, indicating that individuals experiencing economic instability and a sense of powerlessness seek a guilty subject to make sense of their victimization (Uscinski and Parent 2014; van Prooijen 2018).

Similarly, as interpersonal and governmental trust decreases, the belief that pharmaceutical companies hinder the use of treatments or vaccines for social control increases significantly. This can be interpreted as low trust and economic uncertainty driving individuals to question official narratives, with conspiracy theories becoming coping mechanisms.

These results indicate that health authorities and politicians need to develop strategies during times of crisis, not only to manage the flow of medical information but also to build public trust as well. Individuals' belief in scientific data is directly related to their trust in the source of the information. Consequently, transparent communication policies and social support mechanisms that address the economic concerns of disadvantaged groups can reduce the spread of conspiracy theories by restoring institutional trust. Furthermore, it can be said that initiatives aimed at improving health literacy will play a critical role in preventing behaviors that threaten public health by increasing the resilience of individuals, particularly those in the low-trust group, against manipulative content.

5

Artificial Intelligence Conspiracy Theories

Artificial intelligence is becoming increasingly integrated into our lives as a result of the conveniences it provides in areas such as automation and scalability. While the transformation brought by this integration has aroused curiosity and excitement in society, it has also led to an increase in uncertainties and anxieties. Since belief in conspiracy theories is no longer limited to isolated small groups and has the potential to spill over into public discourse, it is important to examine trust in artificial intelligence and conspiracy theories (Barkun 2015). For this reason, this section examines attitudes toward AI and explores how these attitudes vary across different segments of society by measuring the public's concerns about AI, their perception of risk, and their belief in conspiracy theories.

Researchers predict that artificial intelligence will have a disruptive impact on the labor markets of advanced economies. (Magistro et al. 2025). Although it is often said that the integration of artificial intelligence will bring about major changes in many sectors, it is also a source of concern for many people. One of these concerns is the fear of job loss. Recent studies indicate that the integration of artificial intelligence will affect highly skilled workers and non-routine positions the most. (Nigar et al. 2025). This factor may play a role in shaping attitudes toward artificial intelligence.

Gender can also be a decisive factor in determining whether or not individuals fear or trust artificial intelligence. According to a study conducted in the United Kingdom, female participants reported lower levels of trust and higher levels of fear toward artificial intelligence (Babiker et al. 2025). Previous studies conducted in China and Germany have also brought forward similar findings (Sindermann et al. 2022).

Another study remarks that the integration of artificial intelligence into various sectors causes a higher level of unease among women (Mays et al. 2022). Women may have greater concerns about prejudice and job loss due to the belief that widespread use of artificial intelligence could potentially worsen long-standing inequalities in the corporate world (Zhan et al. 2024).

According to research on how gender influences views on artificial intelligence; cultural norms, beliefs, stereotypes, and gender-based assumptions significantly shape attitudes toward artificial intelligence (Parsheera 2018). According to a study by Ofosu-Ampong (2023), women believe that men are stronger in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics subjects, and for this reason, they are hesitant to use AI-based tools.

In this section, attitudes toward technology and artificial intelligence conspiracy theories are examined by looking at differences across both participants' gender and employment statuses.

Figure 3.1 The distribution of levels of concern about artificial intelligence by genders (N = 1545)




Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of anxiety towards artificial intelligence across genders. Participants were asked to rate their level of anxiety towards artificial intelligence on a scale of 1 (Not Concerned at All) to 5 (Very Concerned). When we consider both “Extremely concerned” and “Concerned” responses, a majority of individuals (58.96%) are anxious about artificial intelligence. Looking at the difference between genders, this anxiety is higher among women (60.41%) than men (56.58%). When we look at the neutral group who said “Neither Concerned nor Unconcerned” this group is slightly higher among women than men (12.41%) and the overall group (13.66%).

Figure 3.2 Distribution of agreement with the statement “The world is becoming a much better place thanks to technology.” by gender (N=1577)”




Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of agreement with the statement “Technology is making the world a better place” by gender. Participants were asked to rate this statement on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). 44.26% of participants believe that technology has made the world a better place. When examining the difference between genders, men (50.08%) tend to agree more with this statement compared to women (40.65%).

Figure 3.3 Distribution of agreement with the statement “The world is becoming a much better place thanks to technology.” by employment status (N=1576)




Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of agreement levels with the statement “The world is becoming a much better place thanks to technology.” by employment status. Participants were asked to rate this statement on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Most participants (44.29%) believe that technology has made the world a better place. When examining the differences in employment statuses, non-workers’ agreement rate with the statement (%40.97) is lower compared to the working group (%47.24).

Figure 3.4 Distribution of agreement with the statement “Human life will be controlled by artificial intelligence in the future.” by employment status (N = 1551)




Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of agreement levels with the statement “Human life will be controlled by artificial intelligence in the future.” according to employment status. Participants were asked to rate this statement on a scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). When we combine the “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” responses, the majority of respondents (62.03%) agree with the statement. When employment status is observed, nonworking individuals agreement rate to the statement is higher (%65.43) than that of working individuals (%59.03).

Figure 3.5 Distribution of agreement with the statement “Artificial intelligence will surpass human intelligence in the future.” by employment status (N= 1553)




Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of agreement levels with the statement “Artificial intelligence will surpass human intelligence in the future.” by employment. Participants were asked to rate this statement on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). When “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” categories are taken into consideration together, more than half of the respondents (%54.67) agree with the statement. When we look at employment status, the response rate among nonworking individuals is 59.7%, which is higher than that of employed individuals (50.24%).

Section Review

The findings in this section show that attitudes toward artificial intelligence and technology vary by gender and employment status. It was observed that the level of concern regarding artificial intelligence is higher among women and that women are less likely than men to agree with the statement, "The world is becoming a much better place thanks to technology." These findings are parallel to the existing literature, showcasing that women are more reserved toward artificial intelligence and technology.

The results indicate that unemployed individuals exhibit more negative views towards artificial intelligence and technology. The findings show that unemployed individuals are less likely to agree with the statement that technology makes the world a better place, and more likely to believe in the ideas that "In the future, artificial intelligence will control people's lives" and "In the future, artificial intelligence will control the human mind," compared to employed individuals. Although the literature suggests that employed individuals will be more affected by AI integration, the results show that unemployed individuals hold more negative attitudes. As a matter of fact, a study conducted among Canadian medical students revealed that students did not believe that AI would directly take their jobs in the future. However, the fear of being fired discouraged them from pursuing careers in fields where AI integration is beginning to take place, such as radiology (Gong et al. 2019). Based on this case, it is possible that the attitudes of unemployed individuals are influenced by the fear of being fired due to AI integration when they join the workforce in the future.

These findings indicate that governments need to develop policies to alleviate the growing concerns and fears resulting from the integration of artificial intelligence into many sectors. Providing basic technical information and programming training can help reduce these concerns by expanding people's understanding of the mechanics behind artificial intelligence (Kaya et al. 2024). Additionally, policymakers must take precautions against the risks AI-powered platforms may pose to human rights violations and the perpetuation of existing inequalities.

Despite high levels of public trust in scientists in Turkey, global risks such as the pandemic and climate change are often seen to be interpreted through conspiracy theories intertwined with concerns about economic independence and national sovereignty. This paradoxical structure necessitates that environmental policies be formulated not only through the transfer of technical knowledge but also through social legitimacy and strategic framing. Policy recommendations developed in light of current findings should be based on a communication model centered on transparency and local sensitivity that eliminates skeptical narratives focused on "external intervention" regarding the climate crisis.

To prevent scientific data from being instrumentalized due to ideological filters, decision-makers should support environmental policies with inclusive multilevel governance models that are aligned with national interests and promote democratic participation. An approach aiming for a social consensus that transcends socio-political affiliations is essential for the sustainability and social acceptance of environmental reforms.

Belief in conspiracy theories in the health sector (the claim that the coronavirus was deliberately created or that vaccines are used to control society, for example) may stem from economic uncertainty and distrust rather than a simple lack of medical knowledge. Research data clearly shows that unemployed individuals and those with low trust in other people and the government are more likely to believe in such conspiracy theories.

When the gender factor is examined, women are less likely to agree with the claim "Vaccines impair the immune system" and exhibit more reserved stances toward these narratives. On a political scale, left and centrist participants are slightly more prone to such skepticism compared to right-wing participants. Overall, these findings demonstrate that combating conspiracy theories in the health field cannot be resolved simply by explaining scientific facts to the public; it is essential to alleviate economic problems such as unemployment and rebuild trust in institutions.

In this regard, officials and health institutions providing more social support, particularly to economically disadvantaged segments of society, can be a factor that strengthens trust-building. Furthermore, it can be argued that enhancing the public's level of health knowledge (health literacy) through transparent communication is one of the most effective ways to protect the public against baseless claims and manipulations.

The increasing visibility of artificial intelligence technologies in daily life has led to increased uncertainty and concerns about these technologies. Research findings reveal that attitudes towards artificial intelligence and technology vary according to gender and employment status. Looking at the difference between genders, it shows that women exhibit a more negative attitude towards artificial intelligence and technology. Regarding employment status, it is observed that unemployed individuals have a more negative view of artificial intelligence.

These findings underscore the need for policymakers to propose policies that will alleviate growing concerns about economic inequality resulting from the integration of artificial intelligence and new technologies into daily life. To address concerns about artificial intelligence, efforts should focus on providing technical knowledge and explaining the mechanisms behind this technology. On the other hand, policymakers must take measures to address potential human rights violations stemming from artificial intelligence and the risk that it may perpetuate existing social inequalities.

1. For the three category trust levels used throughout the report, responses ranging from 0 to 4 are classified as “None/Low Confidence,” responses ranging from 4.1 to 7 are classified as “Moderate Confidence,” and responses ranging from 7.1 to 10 are classified as “High Confidence.”
2. In the classification used in Figure 1.4, the “Disagree” category includes responses 1 (Strongly Disagree) and 2 (Disagree); the “Agree” category includes responses 4 (Agree) and 5 (Strongly Agree).

Abalakina-Paap, Marina, Walter G. Stephan, Traci Y. Craig, and W. Larry Gregory. 1999. "Beliefs in Conspiracies." *Political Psychology* 20(3):637–647. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00160>

Akarsu, Büşra, Dilara Canbay Özdemir, Duygu Ayhan Baser, Hilal Aksoy, İzzet Fidancı, and Mustafa Cankurtaran. 2021. "While Studies on COVID-19 Vaccine Is Ongoing, the Public's Thoughts and Attitudes to the Future COVID-19 Vaccine." *International Journal of Clinical Practice* 75(4). doi:[10.1111/ijcp.13891](https://doi.org/10.1111/ijcp.13891).

Aupers, Stef. 2012. "'Trust No One': Modernization, Paranoia and Conspiracy Culture." *European Journal of Communication* 27(1):22–34. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323111433566>.

Balta, Evren, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, and Alper H. Yagci. 2021. "Populist Attitudes and Conspiratorial Thinking." *Party Politics* 28(4):135406882110033. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688211003304>.

Babiker, Areej, Sameha Alshakhsi, Dena Al-Thani, Christian Montag, and Raian Ali. 2025. "Attitude Towards AI: Potential Influence of Conspiracy Belief, XAI Experience and Locus of Control." *International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction* 41(13):7939–51. doi:[10.1080/10447318.2024.2401249](https://doi.org/10.1080/10447318.2024.2401249).

Barkun, Michael. 2015. "Conspiracy Theories as Stigmatized Knowledge." *Diogenes* 62(3–4):114–20. doi:[10.1177/0392192116669288](https://doi.org/10.1177/0392192116669288).

Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage Publications.

Biddlestone, Mikey, Flavio Azevedo, and Sander Van Der Linden. 2022. "Climate of Conspiracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Consequences of Belief in Conspiracy Theories about Climate Change." *Current Opinion in Psychology* 46:101390. doi:[10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101390](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101390).

Brotherton, Robert, Christopher C. French, and Alan D. Pickering. 2013. "Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale." *Frontiers in Psychology* 4:279. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279>

Callaghan, Timothy, Matthew Motta, Steven Sylvester, Kristin Lunz Trujillo, and Christine Crudo Blackburn. 2019. "Parent Psychology and the Decision to Delay Childhood Vaccination." *Social Science & Medicine* 238:112407. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2019.112407>

Cambridge Dictionary. 2024. "CONSPIRACY THEORY | Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary." [Cambridge.org](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/conspiracy-theory). Retrieved (<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/conspiracy-theory>).

Dentith, Matthew R. X. 2014. *The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, Ny: Palgrave Macmillan.

Douglas, Karen M., Robbie M. Sutton, and Aleksandra Cichocka. 2017. "The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 26(6):538–542. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417718261>

Eslen-Ziya, Hande, and Ezgi Pehlivanli. 2022. "The Search for Alternative Knowledge in the Post-Truth Era: Anti-Vaccine Mobilization during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Turkey." *Cogent Social Sciences* 8(1). doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2022.2130213>.

Erokhin, Dmitry, and Nadejda Komendantova. 2024. "Earthquake Conspiracy Discussion on Twitter." *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 11(1):1–10. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-02957-y>.

Galasso, Vincenzo, Vincent G. Pons, Paola Profeta, Michael Becher, Sylvain Brouard, and Martial Foucault. 2020. "Gender Differences in COVID-19 Attitudes and Behavior: Panel Evidence from Eight Countries." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 117(44):27285–27291. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2012520117>

Genç, Kaya. 2021. "It's Not Easy Being Green." *Index on Censorship* 50(3):46–49. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/03064220211048860>.

Gong, Bo, James P. Nugent, William Guest, William Parker, Paul J. Chang, Faisal Khosa, and Savvas Nicolaou. 2019. "Influence of Artificial Intelligence on Canadian Medical Students' Preference for Radiology Specialty: A National Survey Study." *Academic Radiology* 26(4):566–77. doi:[10.1016/j.acra.2018.10.007](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.acra.2018.10.007).

Goertzel, Ted. 1994. "Belief in Conspiracy Theories." *Political Psychology* 15(4):731–742. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3791630>

Grzesiak-Feldman, Monika. 2013. "The Effect of High-Anxiety Situations on Conspiracy Thinking." *Current Psychology* 32(1):100–118. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-013-9165-6>.

Gürpınar, Doğan. 2019. *Conspiracy Theories in Turkey*. Routledge.

Harambam, Jaron. 2017. "The Truth Is out There": Conspiracy Culture in an Age of Epistemic Instability. Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Heins, Volker. 2007. "Critical Theory and the Traps of Conspiracy Thinking." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 33(7):787–801. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453707081675>.

Jolley, Daniel, and Karen M. Douglas. 2014. "The Social Consequences of Conspiracism: Exposure to Conspiracy Theories Decreases Intentions to Engage in Politics and to Reduce One's Carbon Footprint." *British Journal of Psychology* 105(1):35–56. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12018>.

Kalichman, Seth C. 2009. *Denying AIDS: Conspiracy Theories, Pseudoscience, and Human Tragedy*. New York, NY: Springer New York.

Kaya, Feridun, Fatih Aydin, Astrid Schepman, Paul Rodway, Okan Yetişensoy, and Meva Demir Kaya. 2024. "The Roles of Personality Traits, AI Anxiety, and Demographic Factors in Attitudes toward Artificial Intelligence." *International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction* 40(2):497–514. doi:10.1080/10447318.2022.2151730.

Leonard, Marie-Jeanne, and Frederick L. Philippe. 2021. "Conspiracy Theories: A Public Health Concern and How to Address It." *Frontiers in Psychology* 12:682931. doi:[10.3389/fpsyg.2021.682931](https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.682931).

Magistro, Beatrice, Sophie Borwein, R. Michael Alvarez, Bart Bonikowski, and Peter John Loewen. 2025. "Attitudes toward Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Globalization: Common Microfoundations and Political Implications." *American Journal of Political Science* 1–18. doi:[10.1111/ajps.12959](https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12959).

Mancosu, Moreno, Antonella Seddone, Giuliano Bobba, and Federico Vegetti. 2022. "In Conspiracies We Trust: Interpersonal/Institutional Trust and Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories during the COVID-19 Pandemic." DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) 16(2).

Mays, Kate K., Yiming Lei, Rebecca Giovanetti, and James E. Katz. 2022. "AI as a Boss? A National US Survey of Predispositions Governing Comfort with Expanded AI Roles in Society." AI & SOCIETY 37(4):1587–1600. doi:[10.1007/s00146-021-01253-6](https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01253-6).

McCright, Aaron M., and Riley E. Dunlap. 2011. "Cool Dudes: The Denial of Climate Change among Conservative White Males in the United States." Global Environmental Change 21(4):1163–72. doi:[10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.06.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.06.003).

Medeiros, Julian. 2018. Conspiracy Theory in Turkey Politics and Protest in the Age of "Post-Truth." I.B.Tauris.

Murphy, Jamie, Frédérique Vallières, Richard P. Bentall, Mark Shevlin, Orla McBride, Tadhg K. Hartman, Richard McKay, et al. 2021. "Psychological Characteristics Associated with COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy and Resistance in Ireland and the United Kingdom." Nature Communications 12:29. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-20226-9>

Nigar, Meher, Jannatul Ferdous Juli, Uttam Golder, Mohammad Jahangir Alam, and Mohammad Kamal Hossain. 2025. "Artificial Intelligence and Technological Unemployment: Understanding Trends, Technology's Adverse Roles, and Current Mitigation Guidelines." Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity 11(3):100607. doi:[10.1016/j.joitmc.2025.100607](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joitmc.2025.100607).

Ofosu-Ampong, Kingsley. 2023. "Gender Differences in Perception of Artificial Intelligence-Based Tools." JDAH 4(2): 52–56. https://doi.org/10.33847/2712-8149.4.2_6

Oliver, J. Eric, and Thomas J. Wood. 2014. "Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style(S) of Mass Opinion." American Journal of Political Science 58(4):952–66. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12084>.

Özdemir, Şebnem. 2021. "Pandemiden İnfodemiye: Bir Covid-19 Facebook Sitesinde Netnografik Bir Analiz." Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 23(1). doi: <https://doi.org/10.16953/deusosbil.812657>.

Pipes, Daniel. 1997. Conspiracy : How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From. New York: Free Press.

Satariano, Adam, and Davey Alba. 2020. "Coronavirus 5G Conspiracy Theory Fuels Arson Attacks across Britain | the Independent." The Independent. Retrieved June 17, 2026 (<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/coronavirus-5g-conspiracy-theory-telecom-tower-arson-liverpool-birmingham-a9460396.html>).

S. Parsheera. 2018. "A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE." Pp. 1–7 in 2018 ITU Kaleidoscope: Machine Learning for a 5G Future (ITU K). doi:10.23919/ITU-WT.2018.8597618

Sindermann, Cornelia, Haibo Yang, Jon D. Elhai, Shixin Yang, Ling Quan, Mei Li, and Christian Montag. 2022. "Acceptance and Fear of Artificial Intelligence: Associations with Personality in a German and a Chinese Sample." Discover Psychology 2(1):8. doi:[10.1007/s44202-022-00020-y](https://doi.org/10.1007/s44202-022-00020-y).

Uscinski, Joseph E., and Joseph M. Parent. 2015. "Book Review: American Conspiracy Theories by Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent." LSE Review of Books, February 25. Retrieved February 15, 2026 (<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2015/02/25/book-review-american-conspiracy-theories-by-joseph-e-uscinski-and-joseph-m-parent/>).

van der Linden, Sander. 2015. "The Social-Psychological Determinants of Climate Change Risk Perceptions: Towards a Comprehensive Model." Journal of Environmental Psychology 41(41):112–24. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2014.11.012>.

van Prooijen, Jan-Willem. 2018. "Empowerment as a Tool to Reduce Belief in Conspiracy Theories." Pp. 432–442 in Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, edited by Joseph E. Uscinski. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0030>

Yilmaz, İhsan, and Erdoan Shipoli. 2021. "Use of Past Collective Traumas, Fear and Conspiracy Theories for Securitization of the Opposition and Authoritarianisation: The Turkish Case." Democratization 29(2):1–17. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1953992>.

Zhan, Emily S., María D. Molina, Minjin Rheu, and Wei Peng. 2024. "What Is There to Fear? Understanding Multi- Dimensional Fear of AI from a Technological Affordance Perspective." International Journal of Human–Computer Interaction 40(22):7127–44. doi:[10.1080/10447318.2023.2261731](https://doi.org/10.1080/10447318.2023.2261731).